DOST MUHAMMAD LAGHARI through Lawful Attorney vs PROVINCE OF SINDH through Secretary, Agriculture, Supply and

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DOST MUHAMMAD LAGHARI through Lawful Attorney VS PROVINCE OF SINDH through Secretary, Agriculture, Supply and Prices Department, Karachi art. 199(1)(b)(ii)--- Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Quo warranto---Scope---Transfer of pension fund consequent to transfer of service---Regulatory framework---Constitutional petition would not be maintainable on mere apprehensions of likelihood of happening of a future event---Misjoinder or non-joinder of proper/necessary parties---High Court did not exercise discretion against a party not impleaded in the lis---The petitioners who were employees of the Market Committee Karachi in BPS-13, BPS-10, and BPS-11 challenged the transfer of respondent No.4 (employee of Market Committee Larkana in BPS-11) to Market Committee Karachi shortly before his retirement, alleging that his post-retirement benefits had not yet been transferred from Larkana and would financially burden Karachi's funds---Petitioners sought relief under art. 199(1)(b)(ii) on the basis of quo warranto, but did not allege any lack of eligibility, disqualification, or unlawful appointment of respondent No.4---Held: as per the law applicable to the Market Committee employees every Market Committee was required to have a separate pension fund and maintain an account under the title "Pension Fund account of Market Committee" for the members of service---Where a member of service retired, the Market Committee concerned was to be responsible for payment of all post-retirement benefits to the member by collecting the outstanding amount of the pension fund, if any, against the other Market Committee---On transfer of a member of service, the relieving Market Committee was to also transfer his pension fund contribution to the successor Market Committee for the period he has rendered his services in the said Committee---With regards to the plea of quo warranto taken by the petitioners, none of the grounds (a) to (d) provided under art. 199(1)(b)(ii) of the Constitution were made against the respondents Nos.3 and 4---It cannot be argued that respondent No. 4 had no authority to hold public office in the Market Committee Karachi in BPS-11---Nor could it be argued that respondent No.1 and the Market Committee Larkana did not have the authority to transfer respondent No.4---This was not articulated in the petition---It was also not the case of the petitioners that respondent No.4 was not eligible for the office or that he had subsequently become disqualified or that he was appointed by a person not competent in law to appoint him---The aggrieved petitioners had not challenged the holding of public office of respondent No.4 in itself---It was the petitioners' case that they were only aggrieved that the Market Committee Larkana had not transferred the post-retirement funds to the Market Committee Karachi along with the transfer of the respondent No.4---The filing of the present petition also appeared to be pre-mature based on supposition and surmises that the Market Committee Larkana would not (a future event, which was yet to take place) transfer the post-retirement funds of respondent No.4 to the Market Committee Karachi (respondent No.3)---Present petition could not be maintained on mere apprehensions of the petitioners of the likelihood of happening of a future event---No lis could be sustained in law when no cause of action accrued at the time of filing the petition---Notwithstanding certain exceptions, a lis filed on a future cause of action could not be brought to life after its filing due to the cause of action subsequently arising during its pendency---While a Court could take judicial notice of the changed situation and circumstances and can also mould and modify the relief, yet in the facts and circumstances of the case, no exception was present in the case for the High Court to exercise its discretion and save the petition, especially one which was entirely misconceived---Relief of quo warranto was a discretionary relief, and, if the subject-matter of the petition fell outside the scope of art. 199(1)(b)(ii) of Constitution, then such matter was also not a fit case for the exercise of discretion in favor of the petitioners and/or against the respondents---Finally, petitioners not impleading the Market Committee Larkana in the array of respondents was pertinent too---Under R. 14(6) of Sindh Market Committee Unified Code Service Rules, 1983, the Market Committee Larkana must transfer funds to the Market Committee Karachi---as discussed above, the petitioners had challenged the transfer made by the Market Committee Larkana in this context---But the Market Committee Larkana was not made a party---High Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion against a party, i.e. the Market Committee Larkana, which the petitioners themselves had elected not to implead in their lis, when they clearly should have made it a party---No grounds for quo warranto were made out---Petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

DOST MUHAMMAD LAGHARI through Lawful Attorney vs PROVINCE OF SINDH through Secretary, Agriculture, Supply and Prices Department, Karachi art — 2025 PLC(CS) 1098 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH

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