SULTAN MEHMOOD RANA vs NAEEM AHMAD First Sched — 2025 PLD 818 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

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SULTAN MEHMOOD RANA VS NAEEM AHMAD First Sched., arts. 178 & 181---arbitration act (X of 1940), S. 14---application to make the award of arbitrator as Rule of Court, filing of---Limitation, commencing date of---Scope---appellate Court held that the award cannot be made Rule of the Court as it was not filed by the petitioner within 90-day time period stipulated under art. 178 of the Limitation act, 1908, ('the act 1908')---Question as to how the limitation is to be governed, if no notice is given by the arbitrator(s) to the party---Held, that in such eventuality it is art. 181 of the Limitation act, 1908, which is residuary clause that will be applicable and the same contemplates a period of three years--- High Court set-aside the impugned judgment rendered by the appellate Court and directed that, the appeal of the respondent shall be deemed to be pending, which shall be decided on its merits after extending an opportunity of hearing to the parties---Revision was allowed accordingly. Citation Name: 2025 PLD 818 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHOREBookmark this Case SULTAN MEHMOOD RANA VS NAEEM AHMAD Ss. 14, 17 & 42---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Arts. 158 & 178---Application to make the Award of Arbitrator as Rule of Court, filing of---Limitation, commencing date of---Scope---Appellate Court held that the award cannot be made Rule of the Court as it was not filed by the petitioner within 90-day time period stipulated under Art. 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908, ('the Act 1908')---Whether a Court can dismiss the objections to the award but at the same time refuse to make the award a Rule of the Court on the ground that the application of a party for filing/making the award a Rule of the Court was not within limitation---Held: Pertinently, once an award is before the Court, either through the Arbitrator(s) or any party (for example the respondent), then in terms of S. 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, ('the Act 1940'), it is the duty of Court to examine the same and see whether it suffers from any patent illegality or if there is any cause to remit the award to the Arbitrator(s) irrespective of the fact that opposite party (the petitioner in present case) has not approached the Court within time---Provision of S. 17 of the Act 1940 is couched in mandatory terms as the same is signified by use of the word "shall" and cast a duty upon the Court to pass a decree if it sees no cause to remit or set-aside the award---The proceedings under S. 17 commence once an award has been filed in the Court---The very fact that the respondent filed an application seeking cancellation/setting aside of the award means that it was admitted that the award had been made and that the proceedings under S. 17 of the Act 1940 shall commence---Once an award comes before the Court then the Court has got jurisdiction to take further proceedings in accordance with the law and pass a decree thereon---Thus, once the award is before the Court, it is the duty of the Court to scrutinize the award, which is independent of the fact whether any side has objected to the same or not or the application of one of the parties to arbitration proceedings is time barred---In present case, the Trial Court discharged that duty and passed the decree on the basis of the award in favour of the petitioner whereas the Appellate Court has upended the said findings without touching the merits of the case by merely holding that the application of the petitioner to make the award a Rule of Court was time barred which in-fact was not as examined hereinabove, and hence, the finding of the Appellate Court below is erroneous and not sustainable---High Court set-aside the impugned judgment rendered by the Appellate Court and directed that the appeal of the respondent shall be deemed to be pending, which shall be decided on its merits after extending an opportunity of hearing to the parties---Revision was allowed accordingly. Citation Name: 2025 PLD 818 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHOREBookmark this Case SULTAN MEHMOOD RANA VS NAEEM AHMAD Ss. 14, 17 & 42---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Art. 178---Application to make the Award of Arbitrator as Rule of Court, filing of---Limitation, commencing date of---Scope---Appellate Court held that the award cannot be made Rule of the Court as it was not filed by the petitioner within 90-day time period stipulated under Art. 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908, ('the Act 1908')---Whether the limitation period commences from the date of issuance of formal notice in writing by the Arbitrator(s) to the parties or the general knowledge of the parties about making and signing of the award is sufficient to non-suit a litigant on question of limitation?---Held: Article 178 of the Act 1908 clearly depicts that the limitation starts from "the date of service of the notice of the making of the award"---Section 14(1) of the Act 1940 makes it clear that the Arbitrators after making and signing of the award have to give a notice, in writing, of the making and signing of the award to the parties---The requirement of a notice in writing is important as the service of notice is the point from which the limitation for making an application to the Court for filing the award commences per Art. 178 of Act 1908---Section 14(1) of the Act 1940 is to be also read with S. 42 of the Act 1940, which (Section 42) provides that any notice that is required to be served by an Arbitrator shall be served in the manner provided in the arbitration agreement or if there is no such provision then by delivering it to the person on whom it is to be served or by sending it by post at the usual address of such person---Provisions under S. 42 of the Act 1940 make it clear that the Act 1940 provides a clear and specific manner in which the notice is to be served by the Arbitrator(s)---There is no room of implied notice under the law in respect of making and signing of the award---Provisions of S. 42 of the Act 1940 have technical meanings and can only be construed as requiring of issuance of a separate notice in writing by the Arbitrator(s) notwithstanding the fact that a party has knowledge of the passing of the award through receipt of any instrument (cheque in the present case) handed over to him for satisfaction of amount awarded by the Arbitrator(s)---Law of limitation contemplates general principle of administration of justice, which has the effect of preventing a party from having recourse to redressal of rights through judicial process even where such rights subsist and therefore, any law whereby the recourse to the Court(s) is restricted, must be construed strictly---The proceedings should only be held to be barred by time if the chicaneries of law of limitation are made applicable in strictest sense---High Court set-aside the impugned judgment rendered by the Appellate Court and directed that the appeal of the respondent shallbe deemed to be pending, which shall be decided on its merits after extending an opportunity of hearing to the parties---Revision was allowed accordingly. Citation Name: 2025 PLD 818 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHOREBookmark this Case SULTAN MEHMOOD RANA VS NAEEM AHMAD Ss. 14, 17 & 42---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Arts. 178 & 181---Application to make the Award of Arbitrator as Rule of Court, filing of---Limitation, commencing date of---Scope---Whether the limitation period commences from the date of issuance of formal notice in writing by the Arbitrator(s) to the parties or the general knowledge of the parties about making and signing of the award is sufficient to non-suit a litigant on question of limitation?---Held: The Arbitration Act, 1940,('the Act 1940') makes it clear that after an award is rendered, any party thereto or any person claiming thereunder may request the Arbitrator(s) or the Umpire to cause the award or its signed copy thereof, together with any disposition or the document, which may have been taken and/or proved, to be filed in the Court---Pertinently, no limitation has been provided under the Act 1908 whereby the party is required to make a request to the Arbitrators or the Umpire to cause the award to be filed in the Court and again residuary Art. 181 of the Act 1908 is applicable and a party to arbitration proceedings can make such a request to the Arbitrators within three years' time period from the date of making and signing of the award---Imperatively, the object of giving notice to the parties is to enable them to file an application for setting aside the award---Pertinently, when the respondent filed an application for cancellation of the award, he also categorically acknowledged that the Arbitrators had not issued any formal notice, in writing, to the parties regarding making of the award---High Court set-aside the impugned judgment rendered by the Appellate Court and directed that the appeal of the respondent shall be deemed to be pending, which shall be decided on its merits after extending an opportunity of hearing to the parties---Revision was allowed accordingly. '2025 PLD 759 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE', NABILA HAKIM ALI KHAN VS GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB Tenure post---Object, purpose and scope---If incumbent knows he/she can be removed at any time without stated cause or due process, his/her ability to act fearlessly and independently, especially when dealing with potentially sensitive matters involving Government or influential individuals, can be curtailed---Security of tenure, within reasonable limits, is often considered essential for the effective functioning of such roles. Citation Name: 2025 PLD 759 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHOREBookmark this Case NABILA HAKIM ALI KHAN VS GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB applicability of enactment---Principle---When an act of Parliament or a Provincial assembly provides that it comes into force at once, then every provision of it becomes enforceable from the day the act receives assent of the President or, as the case may be, the Governor, unless any provision of the act suggests otherwise. Citation Name: 2025 PLD 759 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHOREBookmark this Case NABILA HAKIM ALI KHAN VS GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB art. 10a---Fair trial and due process---Scope---Fair trial and due process rights guaranteed by article 10a of the Constitution are to be read as an integral part of every sub-constitutional legislative instrument that deals with determination of civil rights and obligations of any person. Citation Name: 2025 PLD 759 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHOREBookmark this Case NABILA HAKIM ALI KHAN VS GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB S. 7 (6) [as amended under Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace (Amendment) Act, 2021]---Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017), S. 230---Election Rules, 2017, R. 170 (1)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Tenure post---Removal---Election Commission---Jurisdiction---Caretaker Government---Limitations---Petitioner was appointed as Ombudsperson for four years but she was removed from service by Election Commission, before completion of her tenure---Validity---In absence of statutorily prescribed procedure for removal of Ombudsperson, particularly when the appointment was for a fixed term, the incumbent could not be removed from office prior to the expiration of that term, save for the universally recognized grounds of proven misconduct or incapacity, which would necessitate a due process even if not explicitly detailed within Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010---Removal of Ombudsperson was not provided under Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010, except in the case of resignation---Even if removal became necessary on grounds of proven misconduct or incapacitation, the power to take such action was logically lie with the appointing authority, i.e., the Government, following due process---Election Commission was nowhere authorized in such regard under the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010---Primary purposes of Election Commission, as delineated in the Constitution and the Elections Act, 2017, revolves around the conduct of free and fair elections---Achieving such purposes inherently, Election Commission was not empowered to direct permanent removal of any office bearer---Nature of removal contemplated in the notification of Election Commission, the "immediate termination of services" - implied a permanent cessation of employment, which did not directly relate to the Election Commission's core function of ensuring fair elections---At the most, Election Commission's powers in relation to public officials during election period, as indicated by R. 170(1) of Election Rules, 2017, and S. 230(2)(f) of Elections Act, 2017, (regarding the Caretaker Government's limitations), extended to transfer or shuffling of public officials with the Commission's approval---Such had suggested a focus on preventing misuse of official positions to influence elections, rather than permanent removal of appointees, particularly those with a statutorily defined tenure---De-notification of petitioner by Caretaker Government of Punjab by way of notification in question was not within its lawful authority---High Court set aside notification in question issued by Government of the Punjab de-notifying services of petitioner as Ombudsperson Protection against Harassment of Women at Workplace---High Court declared notification in question to be null and void and petitioner was deemed to be in office as if the notification had not been issued---High Court directed that to ensure that future appointments to the position of Ombudsperson were beyond reproach, it would be apt to direct that the relevant authorities should, with due expediency, formulate and implement a comprehensive, transparent and merit-based appointment procedure---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.

SULTAN MEHMOOD RANA vs NAEEM AHMAD First Sched — 2025 PLD 818 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

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