PAK LAW GPT — Pakistan Case Law AI justice scale emblemPAK LAW GPTCase law · Urdu & English

COMMISSIONER OF INLAND REVENUE PESHAWAR ZONE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, PESHAWAR vs MISS SHABNAM RIAZ Ss — 2025 PTD 883 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURT

Case information

Citation
2025 PTD 883 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURT
Court
Peshawar High Court
Year
2025
Reporter
PTD
Parties
COMMISSIONER OF INLAND REVENUE PESHAWAR ZONE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, PESHAWAR vs MISS SHABNAM RIAZ Ss
Subject matter
Criminal
Provisions referred to
S. 218; Finance Act; Income Tax Ordinance

Fields are extracted from the reported citation and judgment text. Where a detail is not stated in the record, it is not shown.

Judgment text as reported

COMMISSIONER OF INLAND REVENUE PESHAWAR ZONE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, PESHAWAR VS MISS SHABNAM RIAZ Ss. 218(1) & 218(2), clause (d) [as introduced through Finance Act, 2018]---Income Tax Rules, 2002, R. 74---Service of notice and other documents---Modes---Electronic Service of assessment order---Propriety---Electronic service for purpose of filing appeal against assessment order---Scope---Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue ('Tribunal') concluded in favour of taxpayer that the electronic mode of service provided in S. 218(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ('the Ordinance, 2001') was a secondary method of service and that the limitation period started only upon receiving an attested copy---Whether the service of assessment order upon the assessee in any of the modes under S. 218 of the Ordinance, 2001 could be treated as a proper service upon the assessee in respect of the period limitation for the purpose of appeal?---Held, that service on the individual electronically in the prescribed manner as in clause (d) in Ss. 218[1] & 218[2] was introduced through Finance Act, 2018---Notably, after sub-clause (c) in both [subsection (1) as well as subsection (2)] punctuation (;) and (or) were also inserted---For construction of S. 218 of the Ordinance, 2001, principles of statutory interpretation and effect of punctuation in the Statutes denotes that the word "or" was a disjunctive and it gaves an alternative impression, indicating independent alternatives that were sufficient in themselves, reflecting the legislative intent to treat each mode of service as valid and effective ; which was further reinforced by the punctuation used in S. 218, where semi-colons separate clauses (a), (b), and (c), while clause (d) was preceded by both a semi-colon and the word "or"---Thus, while drawing the distinction between these clauses, the Tribunal wrongly concluded that the electronic mode of service provided in S. 218(1)(d) was a secondary method of service---Punctuation may lend support to statutory interpretation but cannot override the clear legislative intent or the plain meaning of the text---Provisions of S. 218 of Ordinance, 2001 establish that service of orders/judgments via any mode, when completed in the prescribed manner, is sufficient service upon the taxpayer of the Ordinance 2001---Rule 74 of the Rules, 2002 complements this by deeming electronic service valid if confirmation receipt is obtained---The Tribunal recognized electronic service as sufficient, yet its stance (that the limitation period started only upon receiving an attested copy) created inconsistency---Such an approach could undermine the legislative intent of modernizing and streamlining service methods---The interpretation of the Tribunal failed to align with the legislative framework, as it overlooked the intent behind recognizing electronic service as an independent and efficient method, thereby causing unnecessary procedural delays contrary to the law's purpose---In the present case, the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue ('Tribunal') had erred in condoning the delay for filing the appeal, as it failed to adequately apply the statutory framework that clearly defined the commencement of the limitation period---By not strictly adhering to the service requirements stipulated under S. 218 of Ordinance, 2001, the Tribunal's decision undermined the legislative intent of ensuring timely appeals and introduced inconsistency in the procedural timeline, leading to unnecessary procedural leniency that was not supported by the provisions of the Ordinance, 2001---Thus, the proposed question was answered in affirmative ; consequently, High Court set-aside the impugned order passed by the Tribunal---Tax Reference Application, filed by Department , was allowed.

Other judgments reported in 2025 PTD

Back to the case-law library · Search Pakistani case law in Urdu or English