2008 MLD 877 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

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Raja SHAMSHER MEHDI VS Malik MUHAMMAD RIAZ 1974 SCMR 75, 2004 YLR 985, 2005 SCMR 1664, PLD 1988 Kar. 429, Code of Civil Procedure 1908--148 , Constitution of Pakistan 1973--199 , Constitutional petition--TERM , Extension of time--TERM , Specific Relief Act 1877--12 , West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959--13 , S.13---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.12 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.148---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Specific performance of agreement to sell---Relationship of landlord and tenant---Settlement in court---Extension of time---Petitioner was tenant in suit house and respondent being landlord entered into agreement to sell---Proceedings on ejectment application filed by respondent were stopped due to filing of suit for specific performance of agreement to sell by petitioner---Both the parties settled their dispute before civil court and petitioner agreed to deposit balance sale consideration within 15 days---On failure to make payment within 15 days civil court passed an order, against which petitioner filed appeal but it was dismissed by Appellate Court on the ground that no appeal was available against consent decree---Appellate Court also declined to entertain application filed by petitioner under S.148 C.P.C. for extension in time for deposit of balance amount---Rent Controller continued ejectment proceedings against petitioner---Validity---Specific performance of agreement would be no ground to avoid eviction of tenant by Rent Controller, if other requirements of law had been fulfilled---Mere agreement to sell did not confer any right of ownership or right to possess a property without fulfilling requirements like payment of rent etc. as per agreed relationship prior to agreement to sell---Agreement to sell having already been .declared as rescinded and after its confirmation by High Court no further benefit could be allowed to petitioner through such flimsy petitions---Request for extension of time refused by Trial Court was well within its discretion---If petitioner had filed application under S.148 C.P.C. before expiry of period mentioned in the order passed by Civil Court, the same could have been entertained---After expiry of period mentioned in the order passed by civil court, which was 15 days, Trial Court had become functus officio hence there was no question of any interference by High Court in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction---Confirmation of the order by Appellate Court was also unexceptionable---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.